Part 10 of the commentary by Dr. VIshnu Bapat on Shankara’s Tattvabodha.This is a key work which introduces all of the key concepts of Advaita in a systematic manner.

The commentary is based upon those by several other authors, together with the audio lectures of Swami Paramarthananda. It includes word-by-word breakdown of the Sanskrit shloka-s so should be of interest to everyone, from complete beginners to advanced students.

Part 10 looks at the five organs of perception and the six means of acquiring knowledge.

There is a hyperlinked Contents List, which is updated as each new part is published.

VEDĀNTA the solution to our fundamental problem by D. Venugopal

Part 26 examines the nature of AtmA, utilising the ‘descriptions’ from the Brihadaranyaka, Kena and Mandukya Upanishads. How can we ‘know’ the Self, when it is not an object?

There is a complete Contents List, to which links are added as each new part appears.

Belief can be a dangerous thing, as Galileo discovered to his dismay early in the 17th century, when he was denounced to the Inquisition because of his claim that the earth went around the sun and not vice versa. Unfortunately for him, the Catholic Church was committed to the opposite belief so he never stood a chance. Nowadays, of course, we know better and happily acknowledge that Galileo was correct, despite the fact that everyone still talks about sunrise and sunset!

(Although I did not have it in mind when I began this blog, I should mention here in case anyone is not already familiar with it, that this is a frequently encountered metaphor for the change that occurs upon self-realization. Just as we recognize the truth of heliocentricity, yet still talk as if the Sun revolved around the Earth, so the realized man still acts as though he lives in a dualistic world, even though he now knows that everything is Brahman.)

Belief is so often treated by the believer as if it were true knowledge, instead of simply a strongly (and often wrongly!) held opinion. We really ought to know better, given the history of such mistaken, scientific views as the theories of phlogiston and ether. If the most brilliant scientists can be wrong, so can we!

One of my favorite books – ‘The Hundredth Monkey’ (Ref. 1) – includes a chapter on studies relating to the belief that people’s behavior is influenced by a full moon. What these studies find is that people are selective in what they observe. They tend to notice things that support their present beliefs and, whenever they see something unusual, they tend to try to find an explanation. Thus, if someone is seen to be behaving in an abnormal manner and it is noticed that the moon happens to be full, the latter is likely to be used to explain the former, in the absence of any more rational explanation. Such ‘rationalizations ‘ may become so glib, that in an appropriate situation, we may not even bother to check the phase of the moon at all. And, of course, we will recall those situations when something unusual occurred and it happened to be a full moon, but we will fail to remember the many more situations when either it was a full moon and everything was perfectly normal or it was not a full moon and people were doing the most stupid things!

Many of our beliefs stem from childhood. We are told something by our parents (who, of course, were told this by their parents!) and, not knowing any better, and trusting them implicitly, we accept it. If this happens to be something that does not fall within the purview of education, it is very likely that we will reach adulthood still believing what we were told. This is the field of folklore. Thus, for example, we might be told: “don’t go out in the cold with wet hair or you will catch your death of cold!” And we believe it! That there is no scientific evidence whatsoever for such a claim is irrelevant. The most pervasive belief of this kind is one’s religious persuasion. If the Muslim child is brought up as a Christian, he will believe in Christianity – and vice versa. The desirability of applying reason to one’s beliefs rarely occurs to us. As Robert Bolton said: “A belief is not merely an idea the mind possesses; it is an idea that possesses the mind.”

Ultimately, it could be said that “we believe whatever we want to believe”, as the Greek statesman, Demosthenes said. Osho has a good joke to illustrate this (in his book ‘I Am That’, Ref. 2). A man was driving home from work one night in the pouring rain when he passed a young woman struggling with some shopping. He stopped and offered her a lift. When they got to her house, she invited him in for a coffee. One thing led to another and eventually, they ended up in bed making love. Much later, he got up to return home realizing that his wife was going to be demanding a good explanation. By the time he arrived home he had worked out what to do and he took a piece of chalk from the glove compartment and put it behind his ear. As soon as he entered the house, his wife loudly demanded to know where he had been all of this time.

“Well, darling,” he began, ” I stopped to give this girl a lift home. She invited me in for coffee and then we went to bed for a couple of hours.”

“I’ve never heard so much rubbish,” his wife replied. “I know perfectly well what you’ve been up to. You’ve been out with the boys playing pool again; I can see that chalk behind your ear!”

Ref. 1 – ‘The Hundredth Monkey And Other Paradigms of the Paranormal’, edited by Kendrick Frazier, Prometheus Books, 1991, ISBN 0-87975-655-1
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Ref. 2 – ‘I Am That: Discourses on the Isa Upanishad’, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, Rajneesh Foundation International, 1984, ISBN 0-88050-580-X
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This the first of a three-part series discussing the relevance of Kant’s philosophy to Advaita.

Immanuel Kant published the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, with an extensively rewritten second edition appearing in 1787. Between those editions he also published a shorter “easier” introduction to his philosophy, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783). With the later appearance of The Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and The Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant had articulated a complete system of philosophy of incredible depth and complexity, wholly original and unique in its solution to the age-old problems of reason, ethics, and logic. So great was the importance of this Prussian professor, we may justifiably think in terms of pre-Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy. Many have disagreed with his conclusions and offered refutations on one level or another, but all who have come after Kant have been required to address him.

Kant was the first Western philosopher to fully take into account the subjective aspect of knowing, the forms of intuitive understanding we bring to our cognitions, before sensation or perceptual input. As we investigate objects that appear to our perception, not only can we not get out of our own way and truly view the objects as “things-in-themselves,” it’s actually worse than that. According to Kant, the objects are only perceivable as such because we have pre-applied space, time, and causality to our knowing of them. He is not saying there are no external objects, no things-in-themselves. This is not the idealism of Bishop Berkeley, in which everything is made dependent on mind and the existence of external objects is denied. Rather, Kant is saying we can only see our own representations of objects, and that we partially form those representations ourselves, together with whatever sensory data we may be gathering. We cannot see the things-in-themselves, separate from a knowing subject.

The above is an extremely rough sketch of just one facet of Kant’s deep analysis. I am by no means an expert on Kant’s philosophy, nor even a professional philosopher, and do not claim to fully understand all the intricate nuances of his elaborate thought castle. Having struggled diligently through the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena, however, and having found great value in having done so, it seemed appropriate to share a few insights from Kant’s work that might be of potential benefit to students of Advaita. While there is no direct mention by him of the Upanishads or the Vedas, as there is by Schopenhauer, Kant’s discoveries about a priori knowledge, his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and his views on space and time are all noteworthy in that they support the Advaita teaching rather than conflict with it. I do not mean to infer that everything Kant wrote is consistent with Vedanta, only that there are correspondences and parallels worthy of study for those interested in such matters.

A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge

A full treatment will of course be impossible in the space of a brief article, so I will focus only on a few key points, beginning with Kant’s analysis of the distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge:

“In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. A priori knowledge is called pure if nothing empirical is mixed in with it. Thus the proposition, for example, ‘Every alteration has its cause,’ is an a priori proposition; yet it is not pure, because alteration is a concept which can be derived only from experience.” CPR, p. 38: (B3)

Kant called his work a Critique of Pure Reason, because he was examining through critical analysis the faculties of reason as they apply a priori, hence “pure” in that nothing empirical (i.e., sensory) is involved. Later, he came to write the Critique of Practical Reason, to apply his findings to the sphere of functional or moral reasoning. But the masterful first critique is devoted to explicating the underlying structure or scaffolding of the ratiocinative faculty itself. Kant’s first critique is also an intensive analysis of the Subject and its relationship to perceived Objects. He takes the unity of consciousness as primary, and this ties in with his notion of a priori knowledge, including space and time as intuitive forms of knowing — points we will explore below.

It is important to understand that Kant’s notion of pure a priori knowledge does not entail innate ideas present in the mind before experience. Rather, we are talking about knowledge that is not derived from experience at all. This is the case even if this a priori knowledge only becomes manifest with the occasions of experience.

“But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions merely prompting it to do so) supplies from itself, an addition which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice has made us attentive to it and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.” CPR, p. 37: (B1)

Here, in the meticulous language of a professor of philosophy writing in the late 18^th century, is the kernel of an independent derivation of the seer-seen discrimination discussed by Shankara in the early 8^th century. I will amplify on this in the final section discussing Kant’s phrase, the transcendental synthetic unity of apperception, where I will argue that he is essentially talking about Atman. Before I can make that case to the reader, however, we’ll first need a closer look at Kant’s unique terminology and ground-breaking analysis.

Further on the matter of a priori knowledge, consider that no subjective observer can escape from the mechanism by which it receives impressions. Any perceptions come pre-packaged with time and space all woven together as a compound of synthesized knowledge. I believe we are therefore justified in treating Kant’s notion of a priori knowledge as roughly equivalent to avidyA, Ignorance, as propounded in the Advaita teachings. We are therefore talking about mAyA again, in the form of the hardwired ignorance that comes automatically with the point of view of being a separate person. In the words of the great scholar of mythology, Joseph Campbell:

“Also accepted is the recognition which Schopenhauer seems to have been the first to have realized, of this Kantian concept of the a priori forms of sensibility and categories of logic as practically identical with the Hindu-Buddhist philosophy of Maya.” – The Masks of God, Volume IV, Creative Mythology, p. 338.

In practical terms, the Critique of Pure Reason is an extended analysis of the limitations of the Subjective point-of-view. This is one of the key reasons I believe Kant’s work to be of relevance to students of Advaita Vedanta. In his own terminology, he is writing about why the jIva can never “transcend” itself and get to the actual thing-in-itself as it exists objectively, that is, can never observe Reality directly. Kant’s is the first truly detailed exposition in Western philosophy to elucidate why and how we are trapped by the very structure of our own cognitive faculties, and therefore unable to use reason to fully resolve the metaphysical questions of God, immortality, and freedom.

In Part II, we’ll review Kant’s important distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, clarify the meaning of transcendental idealism as it applies to his work, and also analyze a mahAvAkya in terms of Kant’s philosophy.

Q: Does an enlightened one stay enlightened when he gets Altzheimer’s disease? You seem to be saying that enlightenment is knowledge, self knowledge. Can one loose that knowledge again?

A (Dennis): This is the sort of question that first requires very careful definition of terms. What do you mean by ‘enlightened’? Who is the ‘one’ you are asking about? Who gets Alzheimer’s? Who loses the knowledge?

Do these questions answer your question? Have you read my ‘chidAbhAsa’ and ‘manonAsha’ articles?

A short answer might be that body, mind, intellect and world are all mithyA. Consciousness is the only satyam. And Consciousness does not get Alzheimer’s.

Over the past few months, we have had several posts following which there were discussions in which some participants attempted to argue that knowledge was not the direct cause of enlightenment. Alternative suggestions have been that enlightenment comes with nirvikalpa samAdhi or that one has to pursue some course of action, such as asking ‘Who am I?’.

I argued that neither of these were the case; that ONLY Self-knowledge could give enltightenment. This is primarily because ignorance is the cause of saMsAra and knowledge, not action, is opposed to ignorance. And I said that I would endeavor to find quotations from scripture or from Shankara to support this contention (since some participants were not prepared to accept arguments from such as Swami Dayananda).

Below, I have compiled a brief list of some of those quotations and hope these should be adequate to convice readers that the above is the stance of traditional Advaita and it is supported by clear, reasoned argument.

Bhagavad Gita V.15 – 16

Knowledge is enveloped by ignorance. By it (ignorance) people are deluded. But for those in whom this ignorance of the Self is destroyed by knowledge, that knowledge of theirs causes the Supreme to shine like the sun.

Shankara: Discriminative knowledge is enveloped by ignorance. Thereby the ignorant mortal creatures in samsAra are deluded and think “I act, I cause to act, I shall enjoy, I cause to enjoy,” and so on. When the unwisdom by which the mortals are enveloped and deluded is destroyed by wisdom or discriminative knowledge of the Self, then, as the sun illuminated all objects, so wisom illuminates the whole of the Knowable, the Supreme Reality.

upadesha sAhasrI (Shankara) 18.190, 192

The knowledge that one is (really) ever liberated comes from the holy texts and from no other source. And knowledge of the meaning of a text is not possible without first calling to mind the meanings of its (component) words.

 The clearest (form of) authoritative knowledge of the inmost Self arises from such texts as ‘that thou art’ just as it does from ‘thou art the tenth’.

naiShkarmya siddhi (Sureshvara) 3.67

The knowledge of the inmost Self which removes all need for further investigation arises with certainty from the texts like ‘thou art That’. It does not arise from any other means of knowledge.

brahmasUtra Shankara bhAShya 1.1.4

To know brahman is to become brahman. Mundaka Upanishad says: “He who knows brahman becomes brahman.” As brahman is an already existent entity, knowing brahman does not involve an act like a ritualistic act. When avidyA or nescience is destroyed through knowledge of the Self, brahmna manifests itself, just as a rope manifests itself when the illusion of the snake is removed. As brahman is your inner Self, you cannot attain it by any action. It is realized as one’s own Atman when the ignorance is annihilated.

Bhagavad Gita Shankara bhAShya 18.66

Vedantin: Knowledge of the Self is exclusively the cause of the highest good; for, through the removal of the idea of differences, it culminates in the result that is Liberation. The idea of distinction among action, agent and result is ever active with regard to the Self because of ignorance… The dispeller of this ignorance is this Knowledge regarding the Self – in the form ‘I am the Absolute, non-agent, free from action and result; there is none other than myself because when it (knowledge) arises it dispels the idea of difference which is the cause of engagement in action.

 The word ‘however’ above is used for ruling out the other two alternatives. This refutes the other two alternative views by showing that the highest good cannot be attained through mere actions, nor by a combination of knowledge and action. Besides, since Liberation is not a product, therefore it is illogical that it should have action as its means. Indeed an eternal entity cannot be produced by either action or knowledge.

Objection: In that case, even exclusive knowledge is purposeless.

Vedantin: No, since knowledge, being the destroyer of ignorance, culminates in Liberation which is a directly experienced result. The fact that knowledge, which removes the darkness of ignorance, culminates in Liberation as its result is directly perceived in the same way as is the result of the light of a lamp which removes ignorance in the form of snake etc, and darkness from objects such as rope etc. Indeed, the result of light amounts to the mere (awareness of the) rope, free from the wrong notion of snake etc. So is the case with Knowledge.

shvetAshvatara upaniShad 3.8

By knowing Him alone, one goes beyond death. There is no other path to proceed by.

 brahmasUtra Shankara bhAShya 2.1.3

…the knowledge of reality is only from Vedanta sentences.

brahmasUtra Shankara bhAShya 2.1.9

Even in deep sleep and meditative absorption (samAdhi) there is the natural gain of non-distinction, however at the time of waking [from deep sleep and absorption]. there is once again distinction just as before because false knowledge has not been removed.

brahmasUtra Shankara bhAShya 2.1.4

…the knowledge of Reality springs from the Upanishadic texts alone, as is stated in such passages as “One who is not versed in the Vedas cannot reflect on the great Entity” (Tait. Br. II xii 9.7). “I ask you of that infinite being known only from the Upanishads” (Brihad. Up. II ix 26).

taittirIya upaniShad Shankara bhAShya 1.11 2-4

Here, for the sake of distinguishing between knowledge and karma (i.e. scriptural rites and duties) we enter into a consideration of the question as to whether the supreme goal (emancipation) results from karmas alone, or from karmas aided by knowledge, or from karmas and knowledge in combination, or from knowledge aided by karmas, or from knowledge alone…

 …freedom is a permanent entity. That freedom is eternal is surely an admitted fact. It is a matter of common experience that anything produced by action is impermanent. Should liberation be a result of action, it will be transitory; and this is undesirable, since it contradicts the logically justifiable Vedic text: “As in this world the result acquired through action gets exhausted, in the very same way the result acquired through virtue gets exhausted in the other world” (Ch. Up. VIII.i.6).

 (Regarding emancipation generated by karma when associated with knowledge):

 No, for the defect was pointed out (by us) by stating that whatever is produced is impermanent.

Objection: On the authority of scriptural text (e.g. “ He does not return again” Ch. VIII xv 1), emancipation is eternal, though it is produced.

Answer: No, for a scriptural text is only informative. A scriptural passage supplies information of a thing existing as such; it cannot create a thing that does not exist. Anything that is eternal cannot have a beginning, nor can anything be indestructible if it has a beginning – despite a hundred texts (to the contrary).

(Regarding knowledge and karma combined):

No, because karma is known to have a different effect; for karma is seen to result in creation, improvement (purification), transformation, or acquisition. And liberation os opposed to such results as creation etc.

 It (liberation, being identical with brahman) is all-pervasive and non-different from the goers (of the spiritual paths specified in the Vedas). Brahman is omnipresent, because it is the material cause of AkAsa (space) etc, and all conscious souls are non-different from brahman. Hence liberation is not an achievable result.

 Besides, the combination of knowledge and karma is not possible, because of their mutual contradiction. For knowledge – which relates to an entity in which all distinctions of accessories, such as the agent, get merged – is antithetical to karma that has to be accomplished with accessories which are opposed to it (knowledge). Indeed the same thing cannot be visualised as being in reality both possessed of such distinctions as agentship etc, and as devoid of them. Either of the two must of necessity be false, if it is reasonable that falsehood should pertain to duality which is the object of natural ignorance, in accordance with hundreds of Vedic texts such as…

 …Besides, the denunciation of the perception of difference in the sphere of knowledge is to be met with at least a thousand places in the Vedas. Hence there is an opposition between knowledge and karma, and hence also is their combination impossible. This being so, the statement that liberation is brought about by a combination of knowledge and karma is not justifiable.

…the aim of the Vedas is to impart instruction in respect of human goals. That being so, the Vedic texts which are devoted to the communication of knowledge engage themselves in the revelation of knowledge under the belief that since a man has to be liberated from the world, ignorance, which is the cause of the world, must be eradicated through knowledge. Hence there is no contradiction.

bRRihadAraNyaka upaniShad Shankara bhAShya 1.4.7

…the shruti uses the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘attainment’ as synonymous. The non-attainment of the Self is but the ignorance of it. Hence the knowledge of the Self is Its attainment.

 The attainment of the Self cannot be, as in the case of things other than It, the obtaining of something not obtained before, for here there is no difference between the person attaining and the object attained. Where the Self has to attain something other than Itself, the Self is the attainer and the non-Self is the object attained. This, not being already attained, is separated by acts such as producing, and is not to be attained by the initiation of a particular action with the help of particular auxiliaries. And the attainment of something new is transitory, being due to desire and action that are themselves the product of a false notion, like the birth of a son etc in a dream.

 But this Self is the very opposite of that. By the very fact of Its being the Self, It is not separated by acts such as producing. But although It is always attained, It is separated by ignorance only. Just as when a mother-of-pearl appears through mistake as a piece of silver, the non-apprehension of the former, although it is being perceived all the while, is merely due to the obstruction of the false impression, and its (subsequent) apprehension is but knowledge, for this is what removes the obstruction of false impression, similarly here also the non-attainment of the Self is merely due to the obstruction of ignorance. Therefore the attainment of It is simply the removal of that obstruction by knowledge; in no other sense is it consistent.

 Hence we shall explain how for the realisation of the Self every other means but knowledge is useless.

mANDUkya upaniShad gauDapAda kArikA Shankara bhAShya 3.39

Even though this is truly the essence of supreme reality and is well-known in the Upanishads and described there as asparsha yoga, as it is free from all kinds of touch in the nature of relationship with objects, still it is difficult to be realised by all Yogins – ‘all Yogins’ means yogins without the knowledge of Vedanta. This yoga can be attained only by those yogins who have made an effort to attain the knowledge that Atma alone is the truth.

muNDaka upaniShad 3.2.9

Indeed that person who knows that limitless brahman becomes brahman itself.

kena upaniShad Shankara bhAShya Introduction

‘In order to know that Reality fully, he must go, with sacrificial faggots inhand, only to a teacher who is versed in the Vedas and is established in brahman’ (Mun. Up I.ii.12). In this way alone, does a man of detachment acquire the competence to hear, meditate on, and realize the knowledge of the indwelling Self, and not otherwise.

bRRihadAraNyaka upaniShad Shankara bhAShya Introduction to II.iv

Rites… constitute the domain of ignorance, because they do not lead to the attainment of Self… The son and the rest have been prescribed in the shruti as a means to the attainment of the world of men, of the manes and the gods, not as means to the attainment of the Self…

 They do not also know the contradiction, involving incongruity, between the attainment of knowledge, which obliterates all action with its factors and results, and ignorance together with all its effects… The contradiction rests on the opposite trends of the nature of rites and that of knowledge, which partake respectively of ignorance and illumination… ‘Men are bound by rites and freed by knowledge.’… Therefore the knowledge of brahman leads to the highest goal for man not with, but without the help of any auxiliary means, for otherwise there would be contradiction all round.

Q: At the end of the day, what does knowledge of self give us ? It does not help to answer the burning question of why the appearance/dream/mAyA that we are experiencing as humans or animals exists. Also, it appears that even if one attains knowledge of self in one life, he/she can actually become a cockroach in the next due to karmic effect, ie we are not really liberated from the brith-death cycle. The only benefit I do see in a life in which one attains knowledge of self is that one might lead a life devoid of misery in the mind as we sail through good and bad times, even though we may experience physical pain.

A (Dennis): Self-knowledge removes Self-ignorance and it is that which makes us think we are limited, unhappy, doomed to old age and death. With Self-knowledge we realize that we are not human, living in an inhospitable world; we are brahman. The world appears as separate because of our ignorance. On gaining Self-knowledge, we realize that it’s substance is nothing but brahman.

From the perspective of the ignorant person, there is rebirth (possibly as a cockroach) and we are subject to karma. With Self-knowledge, we realize that there is no person, no birth or rebirth, no death, no creation.

The idea that knowledge is pointless is actually the main argument of the pUrvamImAMsika philosopher. They believe that only the karmakANDa portion of the Vedas is relevant – rituals that we have to perform in order to gain benefits. They say that the Upanishads etc are only supporting material to be meditated on. In the Brahmasutras, I.1.4, Vyasa effectively refutes all those philosophers who deny that brahman is the principal topic of the Vedas. But he does this with the single word ‘tu’ (tattu samanvayAt). Fortunately Shankara takes the opportunity to take up arms against pUrvamImAMsA. Whilst he agrees that knowledge in itself is often useless – we need actually to do something in order to gain some benefit – there is one situation in which ONLY knowledge bears fruit. That is when the problem is one of ignorance. The classic example is the rope mistaken for a snake. As soon as we find out that it is a rope, all our fears etc disappear. And our essential problem in life is that we believe we are a limited person. The knowledge that is to be gained from Advaita is that we are brahman – and that reveals that we have no real problems at all.

 https://www.quora.com/What-makes-the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-so-unexpectedly-hard

Q: I read an article of yours in which you said that traditional Advaita is a “proven methodology.” You also say that it is impossible to tell if another person is enlightened. But if you can’t tell if someone is enlightened as a result of practicing Advaita, how can you say that Advaita is a “proven methodology”? What constitutes “proof”?

Responses from Martin and Dennis

A (Martin): There are two parts to the question: 1) what constitutes proof in the context of Advaita Vedanta; 2) What does the questioner mean by enlightenment.

1) Is a proof here the proficiency in discussing/remembering/debating on topics of this tradition shown by one who has followed it for x number of years?

Answer: That can hardly be a proof. Whether parrot-like or not, ability in this regard may show, at best, a degree of intellectual understanding in the areas discussed as well as, possibly, a good memory and lexical ability. A real proof would consist in bringing about a complete change in outlook on life, meaning an inner transformation in the way the person sees the world and reacts to it. Does he/she see themselves as a doer? This may not be evident to anyone other the one undergoing the change.

I answered this question in Quora along similar lines:

“A prevalent idea is that ‘the hallmark of the great sages such as those mentioned above [Ramana Maharshi and Nisargadatta Maharaj] is that they have a transparent, translucent quality that emanates contentment and  peace.’  Many, however, will think that the translucent quality, etc. is a very subjective statement (Sufis call it barakah), hard or impossible to assess – it is, to be sure, ‘in the eyes of the beholder’. Quite a different opinion or assessment from the above is saying – and it has been said – that ‘if you pass by or come close to a self-realized person, you will not be able to notice that s/he is such, since there are no external signs to reveal it, the outward behavior appearing as quite normal or unexceptionable.’”

2) What does the questioner mean by enlightenment or self-realization? Is there such? There are different views on this and I prefer not to elaborate, other than repeating that it is – from the empirical or vyAvahArika point of view – an inner transformation which brings about peace of mind, serenity or impassibility, and all doubts and uncertainties being eliminated.

A (Dennis): It’s a combination of faith/trust and personal validation. Before you are yourself enlightened, you have to place trust in the teacher/writer/speaker. You base that trust upon personal knowledge, experience and reason but ultimately there has to be some ‘faith’ since the essence of what is being taught is not accessible to any other pramANa. Once your Self-ignorance is eliminated, of course, you then know that the teaching worked. This is the final ‘proof’. But then you also realize that this teaching would have worked in the same manner for your teacher and would similarly work for others. This ‘proves’ the methodology.

It is similar to some degree to hearing about a foreign country. You have faith in what you hear/read initially. When you go there yourself, what you have heard is found to be true. It is dissimilar to the extent that what you find on enlightenment is not subject to opinion or contradiction, since the truth is your Self and not known via any intermediate mechanism. And, of course, it is the same Self for every other jIva.

The reason why you may have doubts about this may be that you do not accept that ‘enlightenment’ is only certain knowledge, gained in the usual ways. It is not any ‘experience’.

If you are going to put provisional trust in a claim that ‘you are Brahman’ or ‘everything is Brahman’, then it is no big deal also putting provisional trust in the teacher being enlightened.

You can compare this with the ‘method’ of the neo-Advaitin ‘teachers’: they simply give you the bottom line truth without any gradual, supporting explanation. The traditional ‘path’ has an entire series of partial explanations, suited to the seeker’s current level of understanding. These are successively superseded in a manner which has been ‘proven’ to work for seekers for over a thousand years. The traditional seeker is always satisfied at each step of the way, whereas the neo-seeker is usually left bewildered and floundering.

INTRODUCTION

As S.K. Ramachandra Rao relates in his Introduction to Sw. Satchidanandendra’s book ‘Salient Features of Shankara’s Vedanta’ ( a translation of ‘Shankara-Vedanta-Prakriye’ in Kannada language), the Swami decided to find out for himself what the real tradition of Shankara and the latter’s contributions to it had been, since he had suspected for some time that the former had been misrepresented by later advaitins. This desire took form in the way of a monograph he wrote in Sanscrit in 1929 with the title of ‘Mulavidya -nirasa. ‘He applied himself diligently to repeated study of Shankara’s works (Bhashyas on the three Prasthanas) for several years to convince himself that the sub-commentaries (of Vacaspaty Misra and Padmapada) had not done justice to the great master… It was in the year 1920, a year after his wife passed away, that he felt called upon to take this as a mission in his life’.

Ramachandra Rao tells of the help the Swami received from his then mentor K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer, his learning under the renowned scholar Hanagal Virupaksha Sastri, and his initiation (in 1910) by the then pontiff of Shringeri, Shri Shivabhinava N.  Bharati Soon after the publication of ‘Mulavidya’ his adversaries became ‘naturally’ numerous, for not only he showed disregard for the sub-commentaries, but ‘he threw stones at the shibboleth of convention… few patrons came forward to help… ’. Even his former teacher, Hanagal Virupaksha Sastri (who had taught him Sutra-Bhashya) turned against him. By then the Swami became ‘a heretic and outcast’.

It is related that when Krishnaswamy Iyer and the Swami (SSS henceforth) were going for an evening walk on an occasion, the former suggested to the Swami that he should write a book entitled ‘Mulavidya Kutara’ in Sanskrit. The latter did not know at the time what that term meant, but after being present to a conversation between KI and Venkatesha (same as Virupaksha?) Sastry, the Swami felt the urge to find out the original meaning of Avidya as used by Shankara and went to read in detail the Anandagiri commentary on the Brhadaranyaka Bhasya of the great master. He then came to the conclusion that ‘there are authorities in the commentaries on Shankara [to the effect] that there is no avidya in sushupti state’ (S. Raganath – ‘Contribution of Satchidanandendra Saraswathi to 20^th Century Advaita’, pp. 19-20. Further (we read from this source), after reading Panchapadika Vivarana and Advaita Siddhi Sa Vyakhya, ‘he came to know that a separate theory had come into being which was not in conformity with the commentary of Shankara. This is how the basis for the work ‘Moolavidya Nirasa’ took shape’.

As originated by Shankara, the notion of avidya consists in the mutual superimposition of the real self and the unreal non-self due to non-discrimination (in simple terms, mistaking one thing for another). The effect of that is vyavahara – to think and act as if one were the knower, the actor, and the experiencer of the fruits of action. On the other hand, the system offered by Panchapadika postulated avidya as the material cause of the world or manifestation (which purports duality), while knowledge of Brahman destroys that world of duality.

The concept of Mulavidya propounded by SSS was finally accepted and Ananta Murty Sastry was the first one to do so: ‘I realized that I should pay attention to the basic texts more than [to] the commentaries, and now I come to the realization that the opinion of Sharma (SSS) is the opinion of the Bhasyakara and is in keeping with the Shastra and Anubhava… But the other scholars stopped coming for the discussions on Mulavidya from then on’.

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DOCUMENTATION (ELUCIDATIONS, COMMENTS, AND REACTIONS)

A (1) ‘… some people are… stating that even there (i.e. in Sushupti) we have a particular Samsara Dosha (defect of transmigratory existence) called Mulavidya entailing us; this theory is baseless and illogical without any support of evidence of any kind… ‘- from ‘The Basic Tenets of Shankara Vedanta’ (transl. D.B. Gangoli), p. 183.

A (2). ‘Suresvara who explicitly states in the sambandha vartika “kalpyavidyaiva matpakshe sA chAnubhavasamshrayA”, “In my view ignorance is merely imagined, and is established in our experience”. The point here is either you admit mulavidya as imagined, in which case it is something superimposed and invalidates the reason to separate it from superimposition, or mulavidya is something other than imagined in which case it ceases to be something notional, and therefore cannot be removed by knowledge. If ignorance cannot be removed by knowledge then the advaita tradition has nothing to offer the seeker of liberation. Subhanu Saxena.

A (3) Comparison of views:

• Avidya itself is only a device for the purpose of teaching non-dual reality and is ultimately discarded. Also, since the aim of the scriptures is to eliminate this ignorance it is an unnecessary complication to dwell on its cause

Other ancient writers were aware of the mulAvidyA school as distinct from Shankara (Mandana Mishra in Brahma Siddhi “tathA choktam avidyopAdAnabhedavAdibhih anAdiraprayojanA avidyA iti)”

The terms  ‘Vedanta’ and ‘Advaita Vedanta’ are used loosely nowadays to describe teachings whose principles do not factually meet the subtlety within the profound truth of  ‘One-without-a-second’ or ‘There is only the Absolute.’ If this principle is corrupted or compromised then guidance to the truth can be affected from the beginning, which may in turn lead to an incomplete realisation. Alternatively, we may only hear statements describing the highest (Paramarthika) Reality without any means at our disposal for approaching such a Truth.

Being the foundation of its teaching, the principle of Advaita need not be compromised in allowing for the ‘mundane’, empirical experience of the seeker and the questions stemming from his or her experience – the entire Vedic system naturally accounts for development at all stages of life and Vedanta gives an understanding of the exact status of the world, as we experience it, in relation to Reality.

Examples of teachings described as non-dual include Kashmiri Saivism, recent Zen, Taoism, esoteric revelations of the Judaic religions and even Tantric lineages; while the interpretations in the Pancapadika attributed to Padmapada, the Bhamati  of Vachaspathi Mishra and the works of Swami Vidyaranya to mention a few – as well as 10-17^thcentury texts falsely ascribed to Adi Sankara – are what pass for traditional Vedanta. To a greater or lesser degree these systems deviate from the unique standard of what is the pure expression of Advaitic Truth: the Upanishads.

The Upanishadic teaching is based upon a clear and unshakeable principle out of which a detailed structure of the grades of experience unfolds in a wide-ranging and flawless system of knowledge. This ancient path provides a comprehensive orientation within an unchanging principle for the guidance of those searching for higher truth and can lay the foundation for all who wish to walk the path.

The scope of the teaching and its internal logic as it reveals answers and further guidance at the different levels of experience seems to be so naturally and harmoniously ordered, and recondite, as to demonstrate its transhuman origin. In this sense it may be why the genuine, non-sectarian, Upanishadic or Vedantic system of knowledge is the inner heart of the true Sanatana Dharma – the ‘Eternal Law’ of mankind’s relation to the universe and the ultimate truth of Liberation.

For roughly the last 2000 years in the public domain, since the authentic recorded works of Adi Sankara (the ‘Prasthantraya Bhasya’ and ‘Upadesha Sahasri’), and the works of his direct pupil Suresvaracharya, there has been no unadulterated conveyance of the Upanishadic system which has adhered to its structure and coherence at every turn. The fact that Sankara himself refers to Sage Gaudapada, who preceded him, as a ‘knower of the True Tradition,’ shows clearly that it was an established tradition that Sankara was following and not something invented by himself. It was for the purpose of bringing clarification to the many questions and conflicts arising from the different teaching systems of the day that Sankara composed his commentaries on the timeless Vedic revelation – the Upanishads – which all systems accepted unanimously as the authority. It is for this reason that Sankara holds the status of being the intepreter of the Upanishadic knowledge of this age. It is interesting to see that many of the fundamental approaches of the systems he answered and exposed as lacking we can see mirrored today in contemporary spiritual views.

Oral teachings, genuine Upanishad from Master to disciple may have occurred in remote places ; one meaning of ‘Upanishad’ is that it involves hearing a secret teaching, but no recorded text or teaching which transmits the true Vedantic methodology pristinely and to all its extent has been available in general circulation. We also have the complex problem of knowing whether teachings ascribed to Teachers are authentically theirs or creative interpetations happening hundreds of years later by rival philosophical schools.

Taken together, the worldwide spiritual traditions which include, or culminate in an expression of non-duality, can be seen to have statements which do seem to coincide. It is important to see though at what stage of realisation or sadhana such systems or utterances may be declaring the same truth. The ‘multiplicity-in-the-One’ ? The Cosmic vision ? The highest yogic Samadhi of Patanjali ? The ‘eternal’ cylces of Unmanifest and manifest existence as the play of Shiva and Shakti ? The experience of Unity as ‘I AM’ or That which is beyond experience? Is enlightenment an easily realised intellectual modification of mind only ? What are the actual laws governing life in terms of the intricacies of karma and the end of rebirth ? Where do modern notions of ‘embodiment’ and the ‘evolution of consciousness’ fit in, if at all?

True accordance of knowledge, of traditions, is a matter of extremely subtle shades of realisation and validation, which in turn rests on the overall framework of consensus in which such examination takes place. It was this Divine Sruti (the Upanishads) and its consistent network of accompanying yukti (reasoning) which for millenia comprised the gold standard to which every teacher, teaching or text had to be measured; a highest truth revealed to scores of Sages whose realisation reached a refined, ineffable summit in perfect alignment with each other and the Sruti. In this way the Upanishadic teaching is impersonal, it is representative of the highest universal Truth and not founded by the dictates of a single Seer.

We can see that many teachings or statements throughout history may have alignment with the Upanishadic system at one or more of the major stages it encompasses. But teachings may contain other contradictory elements, or lack key correlative understandings, or have vague, unsubstantiated areas or unproven personal claims to enlightenment which reveal them to fall seriously short of providing the seeker with an intact methodology leading to Liberation.

The Ultimate Truth may be strictly speaking, Unknowable and Inexpressible, as it is not finally an object of experience, but that does not mean that seekers should encounter a blank or mystically hazy no-man’s land without an ongoing accessible and thorough approach. An approach validated by those who have gone before and who have bequeathed a clear map. The real Sampradaya and complete navigation through Samsara happens only when in full accordance with the impersonal and authorless Upanishadic system, which is the only one whose final Truth reveals the Teacher, the student and the teaching as completely unreal.

[If you are interested in pursuing these ideas further, there is a residential retreat at Tiruvannamalai in December 2016 conducted by the author’s Teacher. The author can be contacted at original.vedanta@gmail.com ]

Ignorance is a fundamental concept in Advaita and most people who call themselves Advaitins will believe that they understand what it is. After all, enlightenment is often equated to the gaining of Self-knowledge, which is equivalent to the removal of ignorance. Here is the definition of avidyA in John Grimes’ excellent ‘Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy’:

“It is the key concept in the Advaita Vedanta system. It serves as the cornerstone for Advaita Vedanta metaphysics, epistemology, and ethical disciplines; thus its role cannot be belittled. It is characterized by six marks: it is beginningless (anAdi); it is removed by right knowledge (j~nAna- nivartya); it is a positive entity of the nature of an existent (bhAva rUpa); it is indescribable (anirvachanIya); it has the two powers of concealment and projection which respectively represent the truth and suggest the false (AvaraNa and vikShepa); and its locus is either in the individual self (jIva) or in the Absolute (Brahman).”

And this is pretty much how most teachers and writers use the term. For example, in ‘Back to the Truth’, I said: “As long as the ignorance remains, there will be identification of one form or another and we will believe ourselves to be other than our true nature. The ignorance is said to be anAdi, without any beginning, and it will continue until it is removed by knowledge and enlightenment dawns.” This is backed up by shruti. The sarvopaniShad, for example, says (verse 1): “…this egoism is the bondage of the soul. The cessation of that egoism is mokSha, liberation. That which causes this egoism is avidyA, nescience.” Other, later scriptures echo this; e.g. the advaita bodha dIpaka: “Though the Self is Brahman, there is not the knowledge of the Self (being Brahman). That which obstructs the knowledge of the Self is Ignorance. Just as ignorance of the substratum, namely the rope, projects the illusion of the snake, so Ignorance of Brahman projects this world.”

And these twin powers of avidyA are also spoken of in the scriptures. Here is a quotation from the vedAntasAra of Sadananda (although this is post-Shankara):

51. This ignorance has two powers, viz., the power of concealment and the power of projection.
52. Just as a small patch of cloud, by obstructing the vision of the observer, conceals, as it were, the solar disc extending over many miles, similarly ignorance, though limited by nature, yet obstructing the intellect of the observer, conceals, as it were, the Self which is unlimited and not subject to transmigration. Such a power is this power of concealment. It is thus said: “As the sun appears covered by a cloud and bedimmed to a very ignorant person whose vision is obscured by the cloud, so also That which to the unenlightened appears to be in bondage is my real nature – the Self – Eternal Knowledge.”
53. The Self covered by this (concealing power of ignorance) may become subject to saMsAra (relative existence) characterized by one’s feeling as agent, the experiencing subject, happy, miserable, etc., just as a rope may become a snake due to the concealing power of one’s own ignorance.
54. Just as ignorance regarding a rope, by its inherent power, gives rise to the illusion of a snake etc., in the rope covered by it, so also ignorance, by its own power creates in the Self covered by it, such phenomena as AkAsha (space or ether) etc., Such a power is called the power of projection. It is thus said: “The power of projection creates all from the subtle bodies to the cosmos.”
55. Consciousness associated with ignorance, possessed of these two powers, when considered from its own standpoint is the efficient cause, and when considered from the standpoint of its upAdhi or limitation is the material cause (of the universe).

Not everyone accepts this idea of ignorance being a positive entity. Jean Klein for example (‘Be Who You Are’) says that ‘Ignorance begins at the very moment when the ego takes names and forms to be separate realities’. Here the word is being used to refer to the ‘process’ of making the mistake. And it specifically states that it is not beginningless.

But traditionally, ignorance is spoken of as something positive, with all of the aspects mentioned in Grimes’ definition. The Bhamati school has its theory of avachCheda vAda to describe the jIva, in which ignorance is the upAdhi which appears to limit the Atman. The Vivarana school has its pratibimba vAda, in which ignorance ‘reflects’ the Atman. Either way, ignorance is an actual entity, whose locus has to be Brahman, since that is all that exists in reality.

There is a metaphor which talks about putting pure water in a colored vessel, analogous to the idiom of seeing the world through rose-colored spectacles. It is as though the truth is being ‘obscured’ by viewing the world through a covering of ignorance. But there is not really something positive here, in the same way as the colored glass. What is happening is that we have accumulated various opinions and beliefs from books and parents etc and these are ‘coloring’ our judgment. Even the word ‘coloring’ is forcing us to uphold the metaphor and believe that it refers to something real. But what this actually means is that they are influencing our judgment; there is no physical medium in place.

Accordingly, one has to wonder if the problem here is simply one of language. A new word ‘ignorance’ was introduced to refer to the state of ‘not knowing’ but then, because the word became so much a part of everyday usage, we started to think that there was an actual thing called ‘ignorance’. I am reminded of the Alan Watts’ talk which discussed the idea of cause and effect and suggested that so-called ‘causes’ were often invented terms of this sort. And he cited the example of this thing called ‘gravity’ being described as the ‘cause’ for objects falling to the earth when dropped. And he said that, if we dropped a particular object and, instead of falling to the ground, it rose up into the air, then we would have called it a ‘balloon’ and not a ‘stone’. Clever though this sounded when I first heard it, I nevertheless thought that he was deliberately taking an extreme, and unrealistic, example to make his point. But now I am not so sure.

In this case of ignorance, it seems quite reasonable to argue that we could quite happily live without the concept. Shankara’s key concept of Advaita (as indicated by the fact that his commentary on the Brahmasutras is introduced by an explanation) is adhyAsa. This is the mechanism by which we ‘mix up’ real and unreal, or ‘superimpose’ the not-Self upon the Self. And there is a tendency to say that ignorance is the cause of adhyAsa. What I said in ‘Back to the Truth’ about this is: “What Shankara begins by saying is that ‘I’ am different from the perceived object. I make a fundamental mistake when either I see one thing and think it is something else (e.g. I see a rope and think it is a snake) or I think something has an attribute that it does not really have (e.g. I think that the mirage is actually a lake). There is always something real (the rope or the sand with shimmering air above it) and something illusory. The real part is unaffected by our superimposition. What is effectively happening is that we partially see the real part, the substratum such as the rope, and then overlay it with some recollected memory of something else, such as the snake.” There is no immediately apparent reason as to why we should say that this happens because of something called ‘ignorance’.

In the metaphor, it is the absence of light which causes us to imagine a snake where there is actually a rope. This equates to absence of knowledge explaining why we fail to realize that everything is Brahman. But darkness is not a positive thing; it is merely absence of sufficient numbers of photons of visible electronic radiation to trigger impulses on the retina. It is a misunderstanding of the physical process that causes someone to claim that a thing is ‘covered’ or ‘hidden’ by darkness. What they really mean is that the thing is not being revealed because there is insufficient light. Thus, for example, I said in ‘Back to the Truth’ that it is ‘ignorance of our true nature’ that is the reason for saMsAra. What I should perhaps really say, to avoid this confusion, is that it is ‘failure to recognize our true nature’ that is the reason.

Prior to enlightenment, we identify with the body and mind etc. Since these things are always changing, we think that we are subject to change also – and we call this ‘ignorance’. As I said in BttT: “The Sanskrit word for ‘truth’ is satyam and this is also the word for reality. The only reality is brahman. Ignorance is ignoring (literally ‘turning away from’) this truth through identifying ourselves with a body, mind, belief, cause or whatever. We mistakenly take these things to be real in their own right instead of simply a form of one essential reality.” Ignorance is this ‘making a mistake’, not something positive in its own right.

The reason I have been thinking about all this is that I have been reading SSSS’s (that’s Sri Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati, if you didn’t know!) ‘The Heart of Sri Shankara’ (an incredible translation by A. J. Alston, since the original is in Sanskrit), which is all about logically destroying the idea of a causal, positive ignorance. There have been many discussions (or perhaps ‘arguments’ might be a better word) on this topic and there is another difficult, academic text, which looks at these ideas of SSSS and does not altogether agree with them! (This is the doctoral thesis of Martha Doherty, a disciple of Swami Dayananda.)

SSSS says, amongst many other things, that: “The final truth is that one cannot say that Ignorance really has either an object or a locus. For (Ignorance cannot be real, since) what is real cannot be brought to an end.” “…adequate reflection shows that there is no reality ‘Ignorance’ over and above different forms of (wrong) knowledge. Ignorance is either absence of knowledge or doubtful knowledge or wrong knowledge, as Sri Shankara has remarked (Brihadaranyaka bhAShya 3.3.1).”

With apologies — or Not

(Read Part 7 of the series.)

Empiricism and Idealism         Locke and Berkeley)

Empiricism

Born some eighteen years before the death of Descartes, the Englishman John Locke claimed that reason was not the principal means for finding out about the world, as the earlier philosopher had contended. Instead, he advocated an empirical approach to knowledge, i.e. using one’s senses actually to see what is the case. This is the only means for obtaining raw data and we use reason subsequently to make sense of it. Only then can it become knowledge. He believed his own purpose in life was to enquire into human knowledge to discover its limits and the extent to which we could be certain of it.

Unlike modern, evolutionary psychologists, he believed that we are effectively born with no innate knowledge, a metaphorical ‘blank slate’. All of our knowledge and understanding is therefore built upon information derived from our senses. Everything we know or think about ultimately comes from experience. The limits of what we can know about reality are fixed by the abilities of the senses and the associated mental equipment.

As an aside, there is a danger of wondering what all of this has to do with the meaning of our lives. Is it not all simply airy imaginings, arguing about concepts that have little relevance in our everyday world? Well, no. If we are wondering what we ought to do, we are bound to ask ourselves what reasons there might be for acting in one way rather than another. Any grounds for such reasons must come from our existing knowledge about the world and our place in it. This knowledge can only arise from a few sources. The main ones are by reasoning from a more basic set of premises (which is what Descartes was doing) or by observing the world and drawing conclusions or making inferences in a broadly scientific way (which is what empiricism proposes). Therefore we do need to be aware of this and decide for ourselves how trustworthy the data might be, even if we do not actually make any significant investigation into them. (The term for ‘source of knowledge’ in Advaita is pramANa and, if you search for this term, you will find several pages of articles which discuss them in more or less detail.)

Locke believed that external objects had what he called ‘primary’ qualities, which were aspects that could be measured scientifically such as length, mass, velocity and so on. Those aspects such as smell and taste, he called ‘secondary’ qualities and he said that these were not ‘intrinsic’ to the object itself (they could not be measured scientifically) but were simply a subjective interpretation in our mind, triggered by the primary qualities.

He said that we can only ever be aware of these qualities, which are effectively transactions between an actual object and ourselves as the subject; we cannot know anything about the matter itself independent of these characteristics nor of ourselves independent of these experiences. Most importantly, the conclusions of this approach meant that we can never know any absolute truths about the universe, only develop possible hypotheses that seem to explain our observations. Once we accept this, we can stop wasting our time trying to understand things that are forever beyond our ken.

He recognised several varieties of knowledge. The most certain type of knowledge that we have is ‘intuitive’, as in the certainty with which we know that 2 + 2 = 4. We may not be able to say how we know this to be true but we have no doubt about it. Sometimes, we can see the truth about something by reasoning from something that is intuitively obvious via several steps, each of which, in turn, is also intuitively obvious. In this way we can arrive, by what he called ‘demonstration’ at some new knowledge that we did not have to begin with. This knowledge is almost as certain as the first, though we might make a mistake in the reasoning process.

A third type is that which arrives via our senses, ‘sensitive’ knowledge, which has a quality about it that is different from something that is simply remembered or dreamt. The smell of a flower, for example, may be brought to mind but is so much more immediate and positive when we actually go out into the garden and put our nose to the flower. Here however we know that the senses can be mistaken, as in an optical illusion, so that the knowledge is less certain. But in general the difference in quality between actual sense and remembrance of it gives us a high degree of confidence of the existence of external objects.

With these three types of knowledge, then, we discover that we can be directly certain of only one thing, namely our own existence – to this extent he agreed with Descartes. Beyond this, we could demonstrate, he thought, the existence of God. But as regards everything else, we could only know those things about which we could derive sensitive knowledge. If they were not accessible to our senses, then we couldn’t find out anything about them at all and could not even be sure of their existence.

As regards how we ought to act, Locke believed that the aim of all our desires is to achieve happiness, which is effectively the ultimate pleasure. Things are ‘good’ to the extent that they bring about pleasure or minimise pain. But, believing in God as he did, he also insisted that we should exercise control over our desires so as to live a virtuous life – breaking the commandments would lead us to hell. God has provided us with senses for acquiring data and from these we derive beliefs and He has given us the faculty of reason in order to be able to turn this into knowledge.

The idea of using reason to validate the moral instructions of the bible did not go down very well with many of his contemporaries, who thought this tantamount to encouraging atheism. They also preferred to think that the basic principles of morality were somehow innate rather than instilled into us during childhood. (More about morality later.)

Idealism

Bishop George Berkeley in particular objected to Locke’s classification of qualities into primary and secondary. This suggested that our senses were unreliable; that reality was one thing while our senses told us something else. Such ideas could only lead us into doubt and scepticism. If the ordinary person saw that philosophers, who had devoted their lives to studying the nature of knowledge and reality, were coming up with ideas that were contradictory to all of their experience and common sense, it could only lead to atheism.

He showed that, if we accepted the empiricist view that all of our knowledge derives from experience then we are inevitably led to deny any objective reality to the world. We can only ever know anything via our senses. Locke had said that there were real objects possessing primary qualities but Berkeley argued that our awareness of primary is really no different from our awareness of the secondary qualities. We are only aware of form, size and motion and so on as a result of sight and touch, and these are ultimately only perceptions in our minds just the same.

That this is all subjective can be shown by the fact that our interpretation depends upon where we are and what we are doing at the time. We can easily misjudge the size of something if there is no known object in the vicinity with which to compare it. If we ourselves are moving, we can mistake the degree to which another object is moving. Everything about a supposed external object is in fact in our mind and there can never be any independent validation that it exists other than when we are aware of it.

It is pointless trying to argue that an object has certain qualities that we cannot perceive and that these are the cause of our perceptions since, by definition, this could never be proven. Furthermore, it would not make any sense to say that our ideas and impressions are like the supposed real object because we are attempting to claim that the object exists relatively unchanging over time whereas our thoughts are transient and change frequently. Our sensations are like sensations, which only exist within living things. We cannot even imagine something, with qualities other than those that we perceive, existing alone without someone to perceive them. As soon as we imagine it, it is by definition an idea in our minds. And if qualities that we cannot perceive did exist, again by definition, we could never be aware of them.

Berkeley argued that all of this followed from the Empiricist assumption that all of our knowledge derives from experience. Since that experience itself comes from sense data alone and all these consist of ideas in mind, we can only ever experience ideas and never any ‘real objects’. Everything that we perceive is an idea and ideas cannot exist outside of the mind. (This includes the brain itself, so that the brain is in the mind, not vice versa!) As he famously put it, ‘to be is to be perceived’.

But he did not claim that the contents of a room disappeared when he left it (nor that we disappear when we are in deep sleep). He also acknowledged that he was not able to dictate how particular objects appeared, as one might expect to be able to do if they existed entirely within one’s own mind. He believed that objects appear to continue to exist independently of any specific observer because the ‘ideas’ actually exist in the mind of God.

Thus his claim was that there are only two elements to our perceptual experience: the perceiver and the ideas in mind that he perceives. There are no such things as ‘material objects’. This theory was called Immaterialism or Idealism (nothing to do with the pursuit of ideals but the theory that what is real is effectively contained within our minds or ideas). Needless to say, most people find his claims fantastical to say the least, despite the fact that they are unable to find any obvious counter arguments. In fact, at the time, Berkeley believed his theory corresponded most clearly with common sense and said that it was held alike by ordinary men (the ‘vulgar’) and philosophers.

In fact, so-called objects in dreams seem perfectly real whilst we are still in the dream; it is only after we wake up that we feel them somehow to be different. Furthermore this difference is not based upon the belief that dream objects are ‘only in our minds’ whereas waking objects consist of matter. Our perception of the relative reality of waking objects is based upon such things as their seeming duration in place and time. E.g. the table that was in the room next door will almost certainly still be there next time that we go into the room in the waking state but quite likely will not if it is a dream. Also, in the waking state, objects tend to remain the same, whereas in a dream a table might well change into a rhinoceros before our very dream eyes. Finally, the amount of control that we can exert over objects differs. E.g. we may be able to throw the dream table/rhinoceros into orbit or be unable to budge it at all whereas the waking table will usually behave in a predictable fashion.

We do not typically use the idea of matter at all when we identify an object as real or imaginary. Matter is simply a rationalisation after the fact of the observed behaviour and is not necessarily a useful concept. And, of course, we can never see ‘matter’, we only experience different physical properties.

And why should matter exist? Just because we perceive round plates and windows does not mean that these things are partly made out of roundness; this is simply one of the properties that we discern. Similarly, the word ‘material’ is used to describe a particular set of properties, such as solidity, shape, colour, texture and so on. It is mere linguistic convenience to talk of something called ‘matter’ that exhibits these sorts of properties.

It should be noted that Idealism is not the same as Advaita (although there are some points of similarity). Advaita accepts the existence of objects independent of the perceiver from a vyAvahArika viewpoint. They are neither in the mind of the perceiver, nor in the mind of Ishvara. To this extent, Advaita is a realist philosophy, not an idealist one. The universe is a ‘manifestation’ of Ishvara, i.e. objects (and jIva-s) are a physical part of Ishvara, like the web is a physical manifestation of the spider. From a pAramArthika viewpoint, of course, all is mithyA. There are neither objects nor perceivers.

To be continued…

Notes on Shankara’s examination of the nature of ‘Error’ in the introduction to the brahmasUtra.

adhyAsa is possibly the most important concept in Advaita – certainly in Advaita as ‘formulated’ by Shankara, since he wrote an extended introduction to his commentary on the Brahmasutras on this topic. I wrote this article originally for Advaita Vision but (as far as I know) it is no longer available at that site so I am reproducing it here. It will be in 4 or 5 parts.

These notes are essentially a rewording, omitting most of the Sanskrit, of the notes provided by Achacrya Sadananda on the Advaitin List and I gratefully acknowledge his permission for this. In turn, he wishes that I acknowledge his own indebtedness to H.H. Swami Paramarthananda of Madras, himself a student of Swami Chinmayananda and Swami Dayananda. His lectures form the basis of these notes.

The brahmasUtra is the third of the so called ‘Three pillars of vedAnta‘, the first two being the upaniShad-s (shruti – the scriptures ‘revealed’ and not ‘authored’ by anyone) and the bhagavad gItA (smRRiti – the ‘heard’ scriptures passed down by memory). The brahmasUtra is a very terse and logical examination of the essential teaching of the upaniShad-s, seeking to show the nature of brahman and the superiority of the philosophy of vedAnta. It is usually studied with the help of a commentary or bhaShya, the best known being the one by Shankara.

It is in the nature of man, with his intellect, that he seeks to enquire into the causes of observed phenomena. The six topics of enquiry for a ‘student of life’ relate to the individual, the world, the cause for these two, suffering, liberation from this suffering and the means for attaining such liberation. Any consistent explanation for all of these is deemed a philosophy or darshana. There are 12 specific philosophies identified in India. Six of these are called Astika and the other six nAstika. Astika refers to those systems which accept the veda-s as a valid means for acquiring knowledge. Conversely, the nAstika philosophies do not recognise the veda-s as valid or reliable sources of knowledge. These latter philosophies prefer to rely upon direct perception and inference or reasoning as the means for knowledge.

The first of the six nAstika philosophies is materialism, said to originate with the teacher of the Gods, BRRihaspati. It is said that this was devised in order to mislead the demons so that they could be destroyed. It emphasises the sense pleasures as being the purpose of life and does not accept such things as heaven and hell, the soul or veda-s. Modern science, with its belief that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, may come close to this philosophy. Materialism only recognises direct perception as a valid means of knowledge. This philosophy is not discussed in the brahmasUtra since it is not considered worthwhile.

The second nAstika philosophy is Jainism. Some aspects of this are discussed and refuted later. The remaining four cover the various aspects of Buddhism. Buddha himself did not teach any real system of philosophy; he only had various dialogues with his disciples. Hence Buddhism was not initially well-developed. Later however it developed into four branches, each of which is analysed and criticised in the brahmasUtra.

Although all of the six Astika philosophies accept the veda-s as a valid means of knowledge, three of them do not accept brahman and four of them given more importance to reasoning than to the veda-s. Only two give primary importance to the veda-s. One of these however, considers that the first part of the veda-s – the one concerned with ritualistic action – is more important than the upaniShad-s. The second gives primary importance to the last portion of the veda-s, and it is this that is the principal subject of the brahmasUtra-s.

A sUtra literally means ‘a thread’. It is a very concise statement expressing the essential meaning of a given idea in a logical manner, free from any defects. A simple translation is therefore not adequate on its own and requires additional explanation in the form of a commentary or bhaShya. Because there exist possibilities for ambiguity, the various commentaries have led to 10 different teachings each claiming that theirs represents the intended meaning. The three most popular (in historical sequence) are known as advaita, vishiShTAdvaita and dvaita. The commentary by Shankara is concerned with advaita.

A brief outline of the brahmasUtra
The brahmasUtra consists of four chapters; each chapter is divided into four sections and each section is divided into topics of which there is a total of 191 or 192 depending on how the sUtra-s are divided. Most of the topics are concerned with statements in the ten principal upaniShad-s. The topics are divided into sUtra-s of which there is a total of 555.

Each of the four chapters is concerned with a particular theme. The first chapter endeavours to establish that the central theme of the upaniShad-s is brahman. This is necessary because some of the other philosophies do not accept this. The second chapter shows there are no contradictions in the teaching since this would constitute a defect. There are three types of contradiction defined – internal (i.e. the vedic statements themselves contradicting each other); contradiction with statements from smRRiti; contradiction with logic. The third chapter discusses the means for attaining brahman, both direct and indirect (the latter covering such aspects as ritual etc., which are merely means for purifying the mind). The fourth chapter is about the ‘fruits’ of knowledge of brahman, namely liberation from bondage and suffering, both delayed and immediate.

Each topic consists of five aspects. The first is the ‘subject’, which is usually an idea from one of the ten principal upaniShad-s. The second element is the ‘doubt’ inherent in the subject (if there is none, there is no need for enquiry). Thirdly, the objections and reasoning of other philosophies are considered. Fourthly, these objections are logically refuted and a conclusion consistent with advaita is drawn. Finally, the connection with the previous topic is shown.

Shankara’s introduction to the bhaShya (called adhyAsa bhaShya) is central to the entire advaitic philosophy, covering the explanation of the basic errors or mistakes (adhyAsa ) that we make that lead us to our belief in a separate existence and hence to the eternal cycle (saMsAra) of suffering. Prior to discussing this, however, there is an introduction to the use of inferential logic, since this is fundamental for understanding the arguments of the brahmasUtra.

A distinction is made between valid and illusory knowledge. What constitutes a valid means of knowledge is crucial to the understanding of this subject of adhyAsa. (Indeed, all Indian philosophies discuss epistemology before moving on to ontological issues.) The senses are usually regarded as our principal source of knowledge but, apart from the fact that information from the senses is not always reliable, much of what is discussed is not directly observable to the senses. Thus we have to be aware of the source of the information and the types of error that can occur in using this as a means of knowledge.

There are six accepted means of knowledge or pramANa. The first is direct perception either through one of the senses or possibly imagined by the mind (of things which are not directly present). The senses are however very specific. For example the eyes can only detect colour and form and are unable to hear sounds from an object. In fact, each pramANa has validity in its own sphere. If something is directly perceived, inference is not needed; if something can be inferred, the shAstra-s are not required.

The next valid means of knowledge is inference from something that cannot be directly perceived. If something cannot be seen directly, nor inferred, it may it be reported in the scriptures or science or directly from someone who can be trusted. For this latter means, the principal source is the veda-s. It is believed that the veda-s were not written by humans and are thus free from the defects associated with human authorship. Effectively they are presumed to have been revealed to the sages, who then passed them on to their disciples by word of mouth. Since they are heard from a teacher they are called shruti.

The three remaining means of knowledge are considered as part of inference itself.
The brahmasUtra relies heavily on inference and shruti as sources of knowledge. It should be noted that the brahmasUtra itself was written by a human and therefore cannot itself be considered as a valid means of knowledge.

Read Part 2 of the series…

Q: I want to ask about the following quotation from your series on upadesha sAhasrI – part 19 (upadesha sAhasrI compiled by R. B. Athreya from the lectures of Swami Paramarthananda):

“Atma, though a knower of everything, is not a known object, because, if Atma were to be a known object it will need another Atma to know, leading to what is known as infinite regress (anavasta dosham).  Atma cannot be known by itself, because, to be known by itself, it has to become both the subject and the object, which is not possible as one and the same entity cannot function as subject and object simultaneously.

We cannot also say that one part of Atma can be known by another part, as Atma is by definition partless.  Thus, Atma is ever the knower but not known by others or by itself. 

As Atma is self-evident, its existence needs no proof.  That I am conscious is evident to me.  The very search for proof is possible because of my being conscious.  Thus, Atma is revealed as self-evident Witness Consciousness which illumines everything and which cannot be objectified by anything.  This Atma is my real nature.  All the known attributes belong to the known objects and cannot belong to the knower, Atma (consciousness).”

My question is:

Atma cannot know Atma (Atma cannot be known), but Atma is said to be self-evident ( I know I  am conscious) also. So does it mean, the self-evident Atma is due to the chidAbhAsa?

I know my face only because I can see my face on the mirror and recognize it. Though my face can exist without mirror and its reflection. Like the Tenth Man Story, he couldn’t know himself until the guru told him.

Mind, which is acting like a mirror, is only mithyA, its substratum is Brahman/Pure Consciousness only. So the self-evident quality is also mithyA.  When the body and mind are destroyed, there will be no chidAbhAsa; after that nothing can be said or known or thought or described. A videha mukta will never say ” I am self evident, I am Pure Consciousness, I exist”. Although, ultimately, there is no videha mukti or liberation either (because, since beginingless time, there is only brahman), body and mind are like the golden ring and golden bangle.

Is this understanding correct?

A (Dennis): There is always a problem when trying to talk about absolute reality, because the reality is the non-dual brahman. ALL discussions, explanations, rationalizations etc take place in vyavahAra, which is dualistic and mithyA. chidAbhAsa is a metaphor, and a very useful one; it can ‘explain’ aspects which are otherwise difficult to rationalize. But the bottom line is that All those explanations etc have to be dropped in the end. This is why the key methodology of advaita is pointed out as being adhyAropa-apavAda.

Most of what you say looks ok but the answer to the question “So does it mean, the self-evident Atma is due to the chidabhasa?” is No. You can say ‘Atma is self-evident’, as in ‘I know I exist’. In reality, there is no such thing as chidAbhAsa because there is no world and no jIva. At the level of the empirical world, you can say ‘that the Atma is self-evident is realized by the intellect of the jIva. chidAbhAsa provides a sort-of-explanation for how this operates if one assumes a real world and jIva’.

A few questions or clarifications please…

1. As you’ve said to me before, to focus on this world and everything within it, is really the wrong focus, because it’s mithyA. And what we really are, is that in which all of it occurs?
2. Am I correct in saying that Vedanta is truly a specific system or process to know who you really are as well as understanding the functioning of everything?
3. So the elements or energy is not who we are since they are dependent on Consciousness. As Nisargadatta said, “without Consciousness nothing is”.
4. To gain self-knowledge however, there must be a body with a nervous system. So the body does matter in relation to self-knowledge? But, consciousness doesn’t care whether it’s manifested or not?
5. Words cause confusion, so what is the difference between Consciousness and Awareness from your understanding?
6. The mind is discussed a lot, and many say that to have ‘no mind’ is the key to peace and freedom. Is the mind a part of the brain or something entirely different?
7. Upon gaining self-knowledge, does the mind continue or fade away if you will, leaving the brain to function in its normal and natural way without the mind blocking it?

A (Dennis):

1. You are not the body-mind; you are Consciousness. There is only Consciousness in reality; the ‘rest’ is just appearance and mistaken interpretation.
2. Advaita is a teaching methodology to bring you to this realization.
3. Elements, energy etc are only name and form of Consciousness.
4. In reality, there is only Consciousness. From the perspective of the person, there is a body-mind. The realization that there is only Consciousness has to take place in the mind of the person in order for the person to realize that ‘All there is is Consciousness’.
5. You can define words how you like. As long as you do this, there need not be any confusion. The way I use these terms is that Consciousness (capital ‘C’) is the reality (better called ‘Brahman’ to avoid confusion); and ‘awareness’ (capital or not) and ‘consciousness’ (small ‘c’) refer to the person’s perceiving/conceiving ability.
6. The ‘person’ requires a mind in order to function in the world. This applies whether the person has Self-knowledge or not.
7. It is likely (though not necessary) that the mind of someone with Self-knowledge will be less prone to disturbance by desire/fear etc.

Q: Please correct my logic below:

• The ‘negating’ (neti, neti) is actually done by the not-Self (intellect, jIva).
• The things negated are not-Self (body, senses, mind/intellect, jIva itself?)
• The witness cannot be negated because it precedes the objects of negation and the act of negation.
• The witness itself cannot negate but it is because of it that misidentification and negation are possible.
• The knowledge that ‘I am That which cannot be negated’ is in the intellect, which is not-Self, and therefore unreal.
• Once that knowledge takes place, then there is no further thoughts such as ‘I am an individual, so and so, this/that’. And I know that I never was.
• Although the knowledge is in the intellect, it is as if the Self regains knowledge of itself. This individual ‘being’ just became sentient due to my reflection in it?
• It is ‘me’ that is reflected in all apparent individuals?
  .

A (Dennis): That is mostly correct. Just a couple of points. The ‘witness’ also has to be negated intellectually, since the act of witnessing has to take place through the body-mind-intellect, which is not who you really are. And the Self-knowledge also takes place in the intellect – it is the jIva who gains Self-knowledge. ‘Self-knowledge’ doesn’t apply to the Self, which is never anything other than the Self. And it does not ‘know’ this in the sense that this word implies – to ‘know’ something requires seeming duality and an intellect.

SInce some of the participants in discussions at this site respect the words of Ramana Maharshi above those of most other sources, I thought the following might be instructive for the present topic of the deep-sleep state.

from “Maha Yoga Or The Upanishadic Lore In The Light Of The Teachings Of Bhagavan Sri Ramana” by “Who”, SRI RAMANASRAMAM, Tiruvannamalai, 2002

The State of Deliverance is egoless. So is deep sleep. So it would seem as if one can become free by merely going to sleep. But it is not so. No one becomes free by going to sleep. When he awakes he finds himself as much in bondage as ever before. We have seen that even the Yogi, when he comes out of his trance, called Samadhi, is in the same predicament. The question is: “Why does not the sleeper, who becomes egoless in sleep, stay egoless? Why does the ego revive again on waking?”

Before we consider the answer, we may notice another feature of sleep, which we find from Revelation. Not only is sleep not the gateway to Deliverance; it is also an obstacle to It. We shall see later on that if the seeker of the Self falls asleep while engaged in the Quest, he has to begin over again on waking. Only if he keeps wide awake all the time, and persists actively in the Quest till the Revelation of the Self takes place, does he become free from bondage. We find this indicated in the third part of the Taittiriya Upanishad, where we are told that Bhrigu, who received his teaching from his father, Varuna, obtained Experience of the real Self – therein named Bliss, Ananda – straightaway from the sheath of the intellect; he did not shed that sheath and become lost in the sheath of bliss – the Anandamaya – which would have meant falling asleep. This last sheath – the causal body – is not separately transcended, but only along with the sheath of intelligence.

When this question was put to the Sage, he referred to the Upanishadic lore, where the question is answered. There is a vital difference between the two states. The Sage enters the Egoless State by the utter and final extinction of the ego, which is the primary ignorance. In the language of relativity he is said to lose contact with the subtle and gross bodies by the dissolution of the causal body – otherwise called the sheath of happiness – which is just this primary ignorance. He passes straightaway from the waking state – by the extinction of the ego – to the Egoless State, which is beyond relativity. Hence it is clear that the Sage becomes free from the causal body. But for this body, there is no sort of connection between the Real Self – which the Sage is – and the other bodies. Therefore he is bodiless and mindless.

The case of the common man going to sleep is quite different. His causal body – the primary ignorance – is not dissolved. Into it the ego and mind are merged and remain there in seed-form until the time of waking. The mind having become quiescent, there is happiness in sleep; but this happiness bears no comparison whatever with that of the Egoless State. The Sage tells us: “The happiness of sleep is like the meagre light of the moon that passes through the thick foliage of a tree and lights up the ground beneath; but the happiness of the Sage is like the unobstructed moonlight that falls on open ground.”

This vital difference between the sleeper and the Sage is illustrated in the ancient lore by the analogy of an ordeal by fire, in which an accused person took hold of a red-hot axe, making protestation of his innocence. If he was burnt he was adjudged guilty and punished. If he was not burnt he was declared innocent and set free. Here the guilty man got burnt, because he covered himself with a lie when he grasped the burning iron. The innocent one was not burnt, because he covered himself with the truth, which protected him from being burnt. In the same way the common man goes into union with the Reality in sleep, covering himself with the false knowledge ‘I am the body.’ Thereby he is a liar, and by that lie he is thrown out and returns to bondage. The Sage becomes one with the Reality, covering himself with Right Knowledge – that is, giving up the ego-sense – and is not thrown out.

The Egoless State is therefore something unique. It does not belong to the world-order at all, to which the three states belong. We have seen already that there is a profounder sleep, the sleep of ignorance, by which the real Self is veiled, so that it is possible to take the ego at its face value, as the real Self. The Egoless State is the State of unclouded Reality, where It shines as the pure ‘I AM.’ This is called the Fourth State, to distinguish It from the three. But this is just a tentative description. The Mandukya Upanishad is careful to say: “They regard It as a Fourth State.” The Sage tells us: “The peaceful and timeless state of the Sage, called Waking-Sleep, which to those that live in (the vicious circle of the three states namely) waking, dream and sleep, is said to be the Fourth State, is alone real; the other three are merely false appearances; therefore the Wise Ones call that State – which is Pure Consciousness – the Transcendental State.”

Thus it is clear that there are not four states, but only one, which is the Natural State of the Self as the sole Reality.

The description of the Natural State as Waking Sleep is very instructive. It tells us that It is the true Waking, but that It resembles sleep. This is clearly brought out in the Gita, which says: “The Sage is awake to That, which is (as good as) Night to all creatures; all that to which the creatures are awake is night to the wide-awake Sage.” The meaning is that the Sage who abides in the Egoless State is awake to That which alone is true, namely the Self; the world is Night to him, because being unreal it is not seen by him at all. Thus Day and Night are distributed between the Sage and the ignorant. What is Day to the Sage is Night to the ignorant, and what is Night to him is Day to them. We have seen already that this Day of the Sage is beginningless, as well as endless, because time is unreal.

This is just to notify readers that (the first part of) a two-part article by myself on this topic has just been published on the ‘Stillness Speaks‘ site. (The second part will be published later this week.)